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10 December 1964

NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Report on the First Meeting of the
Ad Hoc Committee on Overseas Processing

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1. The morning of 8 December 1964 [redacted] of NPIC,
[redacted] DDI, and I attended the first meeting of the subject
Committee under the Chairmanship of [redacted] of [redacted]
the other members being [redacted] of the DIA and
Lieutenant Colonel Paynter of the Air Force. [redacted]
tabled a terms of reference received from [redacted] of the
[redacted] NRO, a copy of which is attached. 25X1

2. As a basis for further work looking toward the strength-
ening of our overseas processing, the group agreed on the following
assumptions:

a. That there will be a continuing need for
quality theater processing to respond in urgent
situations to the needs of theater commanders as well
as of headquarters.

b. That the United States Government
should have quality processing units in each of the
European and Pacific theaters and arrangements for
quality processing aboard a carrier for future carrier
operations.

3. As a means of proceeding, the Committee made the
following assignments, papers on which are to be distributed to the
members by 22 December, looking toward a next meeting on Tuesday, 25X1
5 January, at which time the papers will be considered.

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a. [redacted] of DIA to prepare a draft policies and procedures paper essentially responsive to the first two tasks assigned by [redacted]

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b. Colonel Paynter of USAF to prepare a draft on standards to be used as guidance for the strengthening of the theater processing installations responsive to [redacted] third assignment which would, of course, include a statement of equipment, material, personnel needs, etc.

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c. [redacted] of NPIC to prepare a paper indicating the role which NPIC would play in the PI exploitation and film handling aspects of these processing centers.

4. It was agreed that these initial papers would be approached without detailed preliminary coordination and without commitment at this stage. I am personally satisfied that this is a satisfactory beginning perhaps because the order of business outlined above is essentially in keeping with my own suggestions.

5. I have felt over the last eight years that processing units should long ago have been established in the theater which would be entirely reliable and responsive to the needs for processing and read-out of the results of exotic as well as to other kinds of reconnaissance. One can speculate that the U-2 is on its way out and that, therefore, the needs in the theater will eventually disappear. This may be so, however, this same thought has existed from year to year over the last eight years and may be largely responsible for the fact that we have never seen fit to establish what we need.


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6. I advised the group of my concern that, even though we were able to come up with new policies and procedures as well as specifications or criteria for technical management, we would fail because of the tortured chain of command between headquarters and the theater processing units. For example, the Far East establishment at [redacted] is under the command of the PACAF for CINCPAC for the JCS, yet we have the Air Force and (S) NRO and possibly [redacted]

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all having some responsibility for the quality of work accomplished there. [redacted] at one point indicated as I have so frequently heard in such discussions as these from military personnel that we should give the job to somebody and if he doesn't accomplish it, fire him. The last eight years have shown the firing never takes place. I expressed the view that in addition to assignment of responsibility there must be an assignment of a technical monitoring responsibility to prevent the failure on such an elementary processing function as washing film, as was recently the case in a recent

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cility at

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[redacted] its into this. I indicated I did not know. I speculated that that facility might well serve a certain necessary function in

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[redacted] it could conceivably serve our interests in a principal way in a crisis but that it was no substitute for a

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[redacted] facility in the theater.



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Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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Attachment

[redacted] 23636-64 (w/orig only)


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- 1 DDCI
- 2 DDCI
- 3 DDI
- 4 DDS&T
- 5 D/NIPE
- 6 DDI ([redacted])
- 7 NPIC
- 8 SA(COMOR)/DDS&T
- 9 SA(COMOR)/DDS&T
- 10 SA(COMOR)/DDS&T

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